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CONFRONTING THE GHOST:  




Articles published in medical journals contribute significantly to public 
health by disseminating medical information to physicians, thereby 
influencing prescribing practices.  However, the information guiding 
treatment decisions becomes distorted by selective publishing and medical 
ghostwriting, which negatively affects overall patient care.  Although there 
is general consensus in the medical community that these practices of 
publication bias represent a moral failing, the issue is rarely framed as a 
wrong that necessitates legal consequences. 
This Note takes the stance that medical ghostwriting constitutes an act 
prohibited under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(RICO) and argues that physicians fraudulently named as authors should be 
held civilly liable under RICO.  This Note explores civil RICO, its origin, its 
legislative and judicial history, and the evolution of RICO to areas beyond 
traditional organized crime.  By applying the elements of civil RICO to 
medical ghostwriting, this Note argues that physicians named as authors who 
knowingly fail to fulfill journal authorship criteria should be held 
accountable for their role in disseminating misleading medical information.  
This Note argues that, at the very least, current regulations governing the 
medical publication framework should be better enforced and revised to 
mandate authorship disclosure. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“[T]he medical journal, like the newspaper, is an ever-present friend whose 
influence and advice are potent for good or evil.”1  This statement, made by 
a Chicago physician in 1906, reveals that physicians have long recognized 
the importance of medical journals.  Since their development, medical 
journals have done more than simply disseminate new knowledge of medical 
treatments or therapeutic breakthroughs.  These journals have articulated 
norms of professional and social responsibility, established standards for 
ethical research, and served as platforms for public health discussion.2  Yet, 
like anything of great power, medical journals have the potential for evil—a 
potential that, while articulated over a century ago, only recently fully 
emerged. 
By shaping medical knowledge, medical journals can play a direct role in 
patient health.  A 2014 study showed that nearly 75 percent of physicians 
change their clinical practices quarterly or monthly based on reading the 
results of medical research, and 16 percent of physicians reported saving a 
patient’s life in the last year as a result of reading information in medical 
 
 1. Scott H. Podolsky et al., The Evolving Roles of the Medical Journal, 366 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1457, 1457 (2012) (quoting J.H. Salisbury, The Subordination of Medical Journals to 
Proprietary Interests, 4 CAL. ST. J. MED. 247, 247 (1906)). 
 2. See id. at 1457–59. 
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literature.3  As such, the research published in medical journals significantly 
impacts physician treatment decisions.  Medical research is not merely an 
abstract scholarly pursuit; rather, it functions as a powerful tool used directly 
to affect people’s lives. 
To complicate matters, there is a tremendous amount of research 
conducted in the United States.  An estimated $59 billion is invested annually 
by biopharmaceutical companies in research and development alone.4  This 
vast amount of research is made accessible to physicians via medical 
journals, which rely on peer review to ensure that manuscripts submitted for 
publication are scientifically sound and accurate.5  While steps are in place 
to promote accuracy and transparency, publishing bias is all too common, 
which poses a major threat to public health. 
Publication bias is driven by the tendency of physicians, reviewers, and 
editors to submit or accept manuscripts for publication based on the direction 
or strength of a study’s findings.6  Thus, authors and editors are more likely 
to submit and publish, respectively, studies with positive results rather than 
studies with negative results and are more likely to omit negative data.7  Drug 
companies have an obvious financial interest in how their products are 
presented in research publications, and the selection of positive trial results 
is one way to present the product in a more favorable light.  Further, 
authorship of publications is highly sought after by physicians.  For academic 
investigators (physicians who serve as lead researchers), academic tenure 
frequently depends on securing multiple publications in leading journals, and 
collaboration with industry professionals heightens prestige and can result in 
additional grant support.8  This combination of industry gain and personal 
benefit creates an incentive to engage in practices of publication bias. 
Misleading publications go far beyond simply misinforming doctors about 
the benefits and harms of medical interventions.  Through the doctors, these 
articles leave patients exposed to potentially ineffective, unnecessary, or 
harmful treatments.  In a discipline grounded in principles of objective 
science and ideals of nonmaleficence, the information underlying treatment 
decisions has become muddled, which negatively affects patient care. 
 
 3. Survey:  How Doctors Read and What It Means to Patients, BUS. WIRE (July 22, 2014), 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20140722005535/en/Survey-Doctors-Read-
Means-Patients [https://perma.cc/8V3Z-J797].  
 4. Press Release, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, PhRMA 
Member Companies Invested $58.8 Billion in 2015 R&D (May 11, 2016), 
http://phrma.org/press-release/phrma-member-companies-invested-58-8-billion-in-randd-in-
2015 [https://perma.cc/GU8W-VSM2]. 
 5. See, e.g., Media Center Publication Process, NEW ENG. J. MEDICINE, 
http://www.nejm.org/page/media-center/publication-process [https://perma.cc/5DTS-NSY2] 
(last visited Sept. 21, 2017). 
 6. See Kay Dickersin, The Existence of Publication Bias and Risk Factors for Its 
Occurrence, 263 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1385, 1385 (1990).  
 7. See id. at 1385–86. 
 8. Xavier Bosch & Joseph S. Ross, Commentary, Ghostwriting:  Research Misconduct, 
Plagiarism, or Fool’s Gold?, 125 AM. J. MED. 324, 324 (2012). 
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While there is a general consensus that publication bias constitutes a moral 
failing,9 the issue is rarely framed as a wrong deserving of legal consequence.  
Indeed, those who have been exposed for engaging in these practices have 
suffered only minimal professional or academic consequences,10 creating a 
culture of permissible dishonesty.  Drawing on the few articles that merge 
law and medicine in the realm of publication, this Note argues that certain 
biased practices constitute fraudulent behavior. 
Part I of this Note explores the connected practices of selective publishing 
and medical ghostwriting and their real-world effect on public health.  This 
Part also introduces the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(RICO) and discusses how the statute’s legislative and judicial history 
mandates a liberal interpretation, promoting applicability to areas beyond 
traditional organized crime.  Part II argues that medical ghostwriting 
constitutes an act prohibited under civil RICO and that physicians 
fraudulently named as authors should be held civilly liable.  While 
acknowledging civil RICO as a viable tool to combat medical ghostwriting, 
Part III proposes less drastic solutions to the current medical publication 
framework that avoid placing liability on physicians.  This Part offers greater 
enforcement of current Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulation and 
the implementation of a mandatory disclosure rule as possible solutions.  
While avoiding constitutional concerns, these solutions consider the practical 
needs of the pharmaceutical industry and offer a realistic means of addressing 
medical publication bias. 
I.  PUBLISHING BIAS IN MEDICAL RESEARCH 
AND AN INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL RICO 
Part I.A provides a basic overview of the FDA’s drug approval process.11  
Next, Parts I.B and C address industry practices that contribute to medical 
publication bias:  the selective publication of medical research and medical 
ghostwriting.  Part I.D then explains that a litigatory approach to combating 
publication bias is possible.   
A.  The Approval Process for FDA-Regulated Drugs 
To market a drug for human use in the United States, a manufacturer 
(typically a pharmaceutical or biotechnology company) needs the approval 
of the FDA, the federal agency that determines whether available evidence 
demonstrates that a drug is safe and efficacious.12  The approval process 
begins with the manufacturer submitting an application to the FDA that 
contains the results of preclinical animal tests, manufacturing information, 
 
 9. See id. (explaining that the practice of ghostwriting is perceived as a “slight, easily 
comprehensible moral failing, rather than as unethical”).  
 10. Id.  
 11. For a more detailed explanation of the drug approval process, see Martin S. Lipsky & 
Lisa K. Sharp, From Idea to Market:  The Drug Approval Process, 14 J. AM. BOARD FAM. 
PRAC. 362 (2001). 
 12. See Gerrit M. Beckhaus, A New Prescription to Balance Secrecy and Disclosure in 
Drug-Approval Processes, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 135, 135 (2012). 
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investigator information, and clinical protocols.13  The application proceeds 
if “sufficient hints of drug efficacy” are shown to warrant human testing.14 
The drug then enters three phases of clinical trials.15  If the drug passes the 
third extensive phase of testing, a new drug application (NDA) is submitted 
to the FDA for approval.16  The NDA contains detailed information regarding 
the drug’s composition, results of preclinical and clinical trials, the drug’s 
behavior in the body, and how the drug is manufactured, processed, and 
packaged.17  At that stage, the FDA can approve or reject the application or 
request further study before making a decision.18  On average, the entire 
process takes eight to twelve years and may cost over $500 million.19  But 
the development of new drugs is an important part of modern medicine, and 
clinical trials are an essential aspect of that development. 
B.  Selective Publishing of Clinical Trial Results 
Publication bias favors the dissemination of information about medical 
interventions that show a statistically significant benefit.20  One form of 
publication bias is selective publishing, which occurs when journals publish 
favorable clinical trials that promote the use of a drug but fail to publish trials 
yielding unfavorable results.21  This practice not only has the potential to lead 
to preferential prescribing of drugs with underestimated harms but also limits 
the number and scope of studies available for review by clinicians.22  
Ultimately, through selective publication, unrealistic estimates of drug 
effectiveness may alter a drug’s apparent risk-to-benefit ratio, leading to 
inappropriate treatment decisions.23 
Many reports illuminate the existence of selective publishing, suggesting 
that it represents a deeply rooted problem in the medical community.24  These 
reports show that published literature conveying drug efficacy does not 
accurately reflect drug efficacy according to FDA reviews, which contain 
 
 13. See id. at 138.  
 14. See id. at 139. 
 15. See id.  Phase I determines the drug’s general safety and profile by testing the drug on 
twenty to eighty healthy volunteers. Id.  If not inordinately toxic, the drug moves on to Phase 
II, where well-controlled clinical studies are conducted on several hundred patients with the 
condition the drug is intended to improve. Id.  These studies obtain data on the drug’s 
effectiveness, common short-term side effects, and risks. Id.  In Phase III, large-scale, 
randomized trials are conducted on several hundred to several thousand people to gather 
additional information on effectiveness and safety. Id. at 139–40.  
 16. Id. at 139.  
 17. Id. at 139–40.  
 18. Lipsky & Sharp, supra note 11, at 364.  
 19. Id. 
 20. Kristin Rising et al., Reporting Bias in Drug Trials Submitted to the Food and Drug 
Administration:  Review of Publication and Presentation, 5 PLOS MED. 1561, 1562 (2008). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Erick H. Turner et al., Selective Publication of Antidepressant Trials and Its Influence 
on Apparent Efficacy, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 252, 259 (2008). 
 24. See Dickersin, supra note 6, at 1386 (noting that the first professional critique of the 
problem of publishing positive results and rejecting negative findings arose in the 1950s).  
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information on all trials submitted to the regulator.25  In a study published in 
The New England Journal of Medicine, researchers reviewed clinical trials 
of twelve antidepressant drugs approved by the FDA between 1987 and 2004 
and compared the results of the FDA-reviewed trials to those published in 
medical journals.26  If selective publishing did not exist, the FDA reviews 
and the publications would contain the same information.  Yet the findings 
revealed a bias toward the publication of positive results. 
According to the FDA review, seventy-four studies were conducted 
representing 12,500 patients’ worth of data, while the published literature 
presented a total of only fifty-one studies.27  No evidence of publication was 
found for twenty-three of the FDA-reviewed studies, accounting for data 
from 3449 study participants.28  Out of the FDA-reviewed studies, thirty-
eight were deemed to have positive results.29  The published literature, 
however, reported forty-eight of the studies positively.30   Thus, according to 
the published literature, the results of all but three studies were positive.31  
The study also found that the published literature presented an effect size, or 
assessment of treatment efficacy, nearly one-third larger than the effect size 
from the FDA data.32 
A comparative analysis in the Stanford Law and Policy Review explored 
the specific strategies employed by industries to manipulate the reporting of 
research.33  The analysis found that, in comparison to other industries, the 
pharmaceutical industry publishes more research that supports its interests 
and suppresses more research in cases where the results do not support the 
industry’s interests.34  The article concluded that pharmaceutical companies 
used peer-reviewed publications as a marketing tool.35  After all, once a drug 
 
 25. See, e.g., Rising, supra note 20, at 1562 (presenting findings from an observational 
study of efficacy trials of approved NDAs for New Molecular Entities from 2001 to 2002 and 
noting that (1) many trials had not been published and (2) discrepancies existed between the 
FDA-reviewed trial information and information found in publications, leading to more 
favorable presentations of the NDA drugs in the publications); see also Turner, supra note 23, 
at 259. 
 26. Turner, supra note 23, at 253. 
 27. Id. at 255 tbl.1. 
 28. Id.  The researchers noted there may be many reasons why study results are not 
published. Id. at 259. 
 29. Id. at 254.  
 30. Id. at 254–55.  
 31. Id. at 256 figs.1–2. 
 32. Id. at 255–56.  
 33. See generally Jenny White & Lisa A. Bero, Corporate Manipulation of Research:  
Strategies Are Similar Across Five Industries, 21 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 105 (2010) 
(providing a systematic examination of the strategies industries use to manipulate research to 
promote the industry’s products, thereby enhancing credibility and profits).  
 34. Id. at 109 tbl.1.  The study also included the tobacco, lead, vinyl chloride, and silicosis-
generating industries. Id. at 106.  The categories of research manipulation studied were (1) 
funding of research that supports industry interests, (2) publication of research that supports 
industry interests, (3) suppression of industry-sponsored research when results do not support 
industry interests, (4) distortion of public discourse on research, (5) setting of scientific 
standards favorable to the industry, and (6) dissemination of favorable research directly to the 
public. Id. at 108.  
 35. Id. at 130.  
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is approved for sale, the pharmaceutical company is tasked with selling its 
drug to the only people who can make it available to patients—physicians, 
who turn to the published medical research for guidance. 
While these reports demonstrate that selective publishing exists, they fail 
to show the consequences of the biases.  It is therefore necessary to identify 
concrete examples of the resulting harm.  From the mid-1990s to the early 
2000s, a number of highly publicized incidents occurred involving attempts 
to manipulate clinical research publication.36  Of particular importance is the 
2004 litigation between New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer and drug 
giant GlaxoSmithKline (“Glaxo”).37 
As the first suit to allege the illegality of data suppression, Spitzer accused 
Glaxo of “repeated and persistent fraud” in violation of New York consumer 
protection law.38  Specifically, the complaint identified five studies of Paxil 
use among children and adolescents.39  It alleged that two of Glaxo’s studies 
failed to show that the drug was more effective than a placebo for treating 
depression, and three showed that suicide-related behaviors were twice as 
likely among Paxil users.40  However, out of the five studies, only one study 
was published in a prominent journal, and it suggested favorable results.41 
Not long after the complaint was filed, Glaxo settled for $2.5 million and 
agreed to post all clinical trial results on its website, an unusual move for a 
pharmaceutical company.42  Even with a quick settlement, the suit 
established a new standard with regard to disclosure, drastically altering the 
nature of the industry’s handling of clinical trial results.43  Perhaps in direct 
response, the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE) 
announced that their journals44 would require registration in a public clinical 
 
 36. See Laurence J. Hirsch, Commentary, Conflicts of Interest, Authorship, and 
Disclosures in Industry-Related Scientific Publications:  The Tort Bar and Editorial Oversight 
of Medical Journals, 84 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 811, 812 (2009).  Manipulations included 
blocking of publication by contractual means, withholding study data from investigators, and 
reporting a twelve-month study as a six-month trial that provided misleading favorable results 
without explanation of the changed reporting period. Id.   
 37. Complaint, People v. GlaxoSmithKline, PLC (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 2, 2004), 
http://news.findlaw.com/wsj/docs/glaxo/nyagglaxo60204cmp.pdf [https://perma.cc/E4N3-
GCFK]. 
 38. Id. at 1; see Barbara Martinez, Spitzer Charges Glaxo Concealed Paxil Data, WALL 
ST. J. (June 3, 2004), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB108618482620826827 
[https://perma.cc/GB5S-99UQ]. 
 39. Complaint, supra note 37, at 5; see also Martinez, supra note 38. 
 40. Complaint, supra note 37, at 5; see also Martinez, supra note 38.  According to the 
complaint, one unpublished study showed that 7.7 percent of the youth on Paxil had suicidal 
thinking and acts compared with 3 percent of the placebo group. Complaint, supra note 37, at 
11; see also Martinez, supra note 38. 
 41. Martinez, supra note 38. 
 42. See Jaime Holguin, Glaxo Settles Paxil Lawsuit, CBS NEWS (June 3, 2004), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/glaxo-settles-paxil-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/Y5NN-4HYH]. 
 43. Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Attorney Gen. Eliot Spitzer, Settlement Sets New 
Standard For Release of Drug Information (Aug. 26, 2004), http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-
release/settlement-sets-new-standard-release-drug-information [https://perma.cc/R249-
SZZ7]. 
 44. Almost 3000 journals are listed as following the ICMJE guidance. Journals Following 
ICMJE Recommendations, INT’L COMMISSION MED. J. EDITORS, 
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trials registry as a condition of publication consideration.45  The ICMJE 
asserted the policy was necessary to establish full transparency with respect 
to the performance and reporting of clinical trials.46  Indeed, one of the 
explicit purposes of clinical trial registration is to prevent selective 
publication and selective reporting of research outcomes.47 
These events likely contributed to the passage of Title VIII of the Food and 
Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA),48 which 
established legal requirements for study sponsors and investigators to report 
specified clinical trial information for certain applicable clinical trials on the 
online national registry, managed by the National Library of Medicine at the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH).49  Specifically, the statute requires 
registration at the outset of the study50 and disclosure of trial results within 
twelve months of study completion.51  Congress’ main intention in enacting 
Title VIII was doubtless to improve transparency of clinical research.  During 
a 2007 House of Representatives hearing, Senator Charles Grassley testified 
that the bill would 
expand an existing public data base by mandating the registry of all clinical 
trials and the results of those trials.  This reform is key to establishing 
greater transparency regarding clinical trials, the good ones and the bad 
ones, and to hold drug makers and drug regulators accountable and to give 
doctors all the information they can to their patients.52 
The statute established registration requirements and provided a legally 
defined timeline with specific mandates for the reporting of trial results.53  
Because publication bias is still prevalent years after the FDAAA’s 
enactment, however, compliance with Title VIII remains an issue. 
 
http://www.icmje.org/journals-following-the-icmje-recommendations/ 
[https://perma.cc/RD7S-ZLBS] (last visited Sept. 21, 2017). 
 45. Catherine D. DeAngelis et al., Editorial, Clinical Trial Registration:  A Statement from 
the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1250, 1250–
51 (2004). 
 46. Id. at 1251. 
 47. Clinical Trial Registration, INT’L COMMISSION MED. J. EDITORS, 
http://www.icmje.org/recommendations/browse/publishing-and-editorial-issues/clinical-trial-
registration.html [https://perma.cc/U9BF-GRN8] (last visited Sept. 21, 2017). 
 48. Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 801, 121 Stat. 823, 904 (2007) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 282(j) 
(2012)). 
 49. Deborah A. Zarin et al., Trial Reporting in ClinicalTrials.gov—The Final Rule, 375 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1998, 1998 (2016). 
 50. 42 U.S.C. § 282(j)(2)(C).  Information to be reported in the registry includes 
descriptive information regarding study design and recruitment, as well as contact and 
administrative information. Id. § 282(j)(2)(A)(ii). 
 51. Id. § 282(j)(4)(C)(i)(I).  The completion date is defined as the date that the “final 
subject was examined or received an intervention for the purposes of final collection of data 
for the primary outcome” and thus, does not include time or care related to secondary 
outcomes. Id. § 282(j)(1)(A)(v).  Additionally, because the completion date relates to last 
patient care date, the FDAAA applies to discontinued trials. Id. 
 52. The Adequacy of FDA to Assure the Nation’s Drug Supply:  Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the S. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 110th 
Cong. (2007) (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
110hhrg35502/html/CHRG-110hhrg35502.htm [https://perma.cc/RYT6-KHS2]. 
 53. Zarin, supra note 49, at 1998.  
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According to a recent report, the national registry currently has more than 
224,000 study records54 but compliance with the reporting requirements has 
been low, partly due to ambiguous statutory requirements.55  One study 
showed that after twelve months, the end of the statutory reporting period, 
results were reported for only 17 percent of trials funded by the industry, 8.1 
percent of trials funded by the NIH, and 5.7 percent of trials funded by other 
government or academic institutions.56  In an effort to promote compliance, 
the FDA issued a final rule57 in September 2016, which clarified the 
registration and reporting requirements for the regulated community,58 
interpreted ambiguous key statutory provisions, and developed additional 
requirements necessary to further the goal of transparency.59 
The enactment of the final rule validates the FDAAA’s commitment to 
maintaining public trust and encouraging advances in the design, conduct, 
and oversight of clinical trials.60  Organizations will need to ensure that their 
systems and procedures promote complete and timely clinical trial reporting.  
Yet the specifics of how and under what circumstances the agencies will seek 
to enforce the requirements are not included in the final rule.61  Instead, the 
NIH stated that it expects the “clarification of responsibilities and obligations 
in this final rule will lead to a high level of voluntary compliance with these 
requirements.”62  In an effort to raise awareness of the procedures and 
penalties of noncompliance, the final rule describes the potential legal 
consequences of violating Title VIII, which include civil damages.63 
While the effects of the final rule are not yet known, compliance with Title 
VIII is merely the first step in addressing bias in publication.  In theory, 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Monique L. Anderson et al., Compliance with Results Reporting at ClincialTrials.gov, 
372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1031, 1034–37 (2015).  After five years, these numbers only marginally 
increased.  Results had been reported by 41.5 percent of trials funded by industry, 38.9 percent 
of those funded by the NIH, and 27.7 percent of those funded by other government or academic 
institutions. Id. at 1034.  
 57. See generally Clinical Trials Registration and Results Information Submission, 81 
Fed. Reg. 64,982 (Sept. 21, 2016) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 11).  For discussion of the 
key issues that the final rule addresses, see Zarin, supra note 49, at 1998. 
 58. Additionally, the NIH—the largest public funder of clinical trials in the United States, 
which invests more than $3 billion annually—has issued a complementary policy to cover all 
NIH-funded trials, including those not subject to regulation. See Kathy L. Hudson et al., 
Opinion, Toward a New Era of Trust and Transparency in Clinical Trials, 316 J. AM. MED. 
ASS’N 1353, 1353–54 (2016).  Requirements include submitting applications that contain 
specific information about protocols and other information necessary for effective peer review. 
Id.  Noncompliance will result in the NIH withholding funding to grantee institutions. Id. 
 59. See Zarin, supra note 49, at 1999. 
 60. Hudson, supra note 58, at 1354. 
 61. See 42 C.F.R. pt. 11 (2016). 
 62. Clinical Trials Registration and Results Information Submission, 81 Fed. Reg. at 
65,117. 
 63. 42 C.F.R. § 11.66.  Specifically, if the secretary of the Department of Health and 
Human Services determines that any clinical trial information was not submitted as required 
or was false or misleading, the secretary must notify the responsible party and give it an 
opportunity to remedy the noncompliance within thirty days. Id. § 11.66(a)(2).  If the violation 
is not corrected within that time, the person is subject to a civil monetary penalty of not more 
than $10,000 per day until the violation is corrected. 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(2) (2012). 
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complete disclosure of clinical trial results grants physicians access to both 
negative and positive results, allowing for informed treatment decisions; in 
practice, however, physicians rely on medical journals for this information.64  
Regulating the published information and ensuring the validity of that 
information must therefore be a goal of reform. 
C.  Ghostwriting in Medical Journals 
Medical ghostwriting is the practice of hiring medical education, 
marketing, or communications companies to draft articles that are presented 
to prominent physicians65 to sign on as authors.66  Ghostwritten articles can 
be drafted by pharmaceutical companies that are not acknowledged in final 
publication and include review articles,67 editorials, and primary research 
papers.68  These ghostwritten articles contravene journal authorship 
requirements but are nevertheless published.69  Physicians who agree to serve 
as authors may be unfamiliar with underlying data or relevant research and 
may have provided only limited input.70  While the manufacturer benefits 
from the promotion of its product, the authors also benefit, as successful 
publications increase their prestige and may lead to promotions or more 
research funding opportunities.71 
Because ghostwritten articles often contain selective clinical trial results, 
they can have a significant impact on physician prescribing practices.  When 
a prominent physician lends his or her name to such an article, the perceived 
credibility of the findings and conclusions is heightened, thereby influencing 
 
 64. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.  
 65. The term “physicians” in this Note refers not only to practicing physicians but also to 
scientists and medical academics.  
 66. SEN. CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, S. COMM. ON FIN., 111TH CONG., GHOSTWRITING IN 
MEDICAL LITERATURE 1, 2 (2010) [hereinafter GRASSLEY REPORT], 
http://www.grassley.senate.gov/sites/default/files/about/upload/Senator-Grassley-Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C3EB-HKU8]. 
 67. A review article is an article in which an author examines a large body of medical 
research and offers a bottom-line judgment about how to treat a particular ailment. See Natasha 
Singer, Medical Papers by Ghostwriters Pushed Therapy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/05/health/research/05ghost.html?pagewanted=all 
[https://perma.cc/P8X3-5VQ2]. 
 68. See GRASSLEY REPORT, supra note 66, at 2. 
 69. ICMJE recommends that authorship be based on the following four criteria:  
(1) “[s]ubstantial contributions to the conception or design of the work; or the acquisition, 
analysis, or interpretation of data for the work”; (2) “[d]rafting the work or revising it critically 
for important intellectual content”; (3) “[f]inal approval of the version to be published”; and 
(4) “[a]greement to be accountable for all aspects of the work in ensuring that questions related 
to the accuracy or integrity of any part of the work are appropriately investigated and 
resolved.” Defining the Role of Authors and Contributors, INT’L COMMITTEE MED. J. EDITORS, 
http://www.icmje.org/recommendations/browse/roles-and-responsibilities/defining-the-role-
of-authors-and-contributors.html [https://perma.cc/D5KP-9LLQ] (last visited Sept. 21, 2017).  
The ICMJE further recommends that “authors should meet all four criteria for authorship, and 
all who meet the four criteria should be identified as authors.  Those who do not meet all four 
criteria should be acknowledged.” Id. 
 70. GRASSLEY REPORT, supra note 66, at 2. 
 71. See id. at 15. 
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readers’ treatment decisions.72  The warranty of authorship influences the 
article’s integrity and quality, making it unsurprising that knowledge of 
ghostwriting reduces the credibility of the publication.73  It is therefore in the 
pharmaceutical company’s best interest not to disclose true authorship, since 
these articles play an important role in the marketing and sale of their drugs.  
Ghostwriting functions as a way for pharmaceutical companies to “covertly 
shape the medical literature in favor of [their] commercial interests.”74 
To assess the prevalence of inappropriate authorship in the form of 
honorary and ghost authors, editors of The Journal of the American Medical 
Association (JAMA) surveyed authors published in six leading medical 
journals in 2008.75  Online questionnaires completed by 630 authors show 
that the prevalence of articles with honorary authorship, ghost authorship, or 
both was 21 percent.76  Specifically, ghostwriting was reported at a rate of 
7.9 percent in JAMA, 7.7 percent in PLOS Medicine, 7.6 percent in The 
Lancet, 4.9 percent in The Annals of Internal Medicine, and 2.1 percent in 
Nature Medicine.77  The New England Journal of Medicine reported the 
highest rate among the journals at 11 percent.78  The reported rates increased 
for honorary authorship, with Nature Medicine reporting the highest rate at 
29.3 percent and The New England Journal of Medicine reporting the lowest 
rate at 12.2 percent.79  Less than one-fifth of the articles surveyed included 
acknowledgment sections that identified contributions such as review, 
comments, and analysis.80  While these statistics may seem insubstantial, the 
six journals examined are considered to be among the most influential 
journals in medicine and all have rigorous authorship guidelines.81  Thus, the 
editors who conducted the study suspect that the prevalence of inappropriate 
authorship could be higher in journals with more relaxed standards.82  
 
 72. Id. at 2. 
 73. See, e.g., Jeffrey R. Lacasse & Jonathan Leo, Knowledge of Ghostwriting and 
Financial Conflicts-of-Interest Reduces the Perceived Credibility of Biomedical Research, 
BMC RES. NOTES, Jan. 2011, at 1 (assessing the impact of several conflicts of interest, 
including ghostwriting, on the perceived credibility of biomedical research among practicing 
clinicians).  Two versions of a fictional antidepressant study were presented to hospital 
personnel—one disclosed conflicts of interest and the other did not. Id. at 2.  Perceived 
credibility ratings were lower in the study that disclosed conflicts of interests, and clinicians 
relying on that study were less likely to recommend the antidepressant.  Id. at 3–4.  
 74. See Jeffrey R. Lacasse & Jonathan Leo, Ghostwriting at Elite Academic Medical 
Centers in the United States, PLOS MED., Feb. 2010, at 1. 
 75. See Joseph S. Wislar et al., Honorary and Ghost Authorship in High Impact 
Biomedical Journals:  A Cross Sectional Survey, BMJ, Oct. 2011, at 1.  ICMJE authorship 
criteria was used to define honorary authors as individuals who are named as authors but who 
have not met authorship criteria and ghost authors as individuals who have made substantial 
contributions to the work reported in an article but who are not named as authors. Id. at 1–2.  
For the purposes of this Note, “ghostwriting” includes both honorary authors and ghost 
authors. 
 76. Id. at 3.  
 77. Id. at 7 tbl.1. 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 4.  
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. 
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Additionally, while respondents were assured confidentiality, underreporting 
of honorary and ghost authorship was expected, indicating that the results do 
not reveal the true extent of inappropriate authorship.83 
The prevalence of ghostwriting fails to give credence to its dangerous 
consequences.  The highly publicized Merck case provides an example.  
Before the pharmaceutical giant Merck voluntarily pulled its multibillion-
dollar drug Vioxx from the market, the FDA warned Merck that its 
promotional campaign minimized potentially serious cardiovascular risks.84  
The FDA instructed the company to contact physicians to “correct false or 
misleading impressions and information” that it had disseminated through 
advertisements and publications.85  Despite these warnings, the drug 
remained on the market for three more years, possibly contributing to nearly 
28,000 heart attacks and deaths over four years.86 
Merck’s handling of Vioxx spurred litigation that triggered the medical 
community to examine Merck’s internal documents in an effort to better 
understand collaborations between the pharmaceutical industry and medical 
profession.87  After reviewing 250 documents, a pattern emerged 
demonstrating that Merck prepared manuscripts for its own clinical trials and 
recruited external, academically affiliated physicians to be honorary 
authors.88  The documents revealed that the clinical trials and analyses of 
manuscripts were completed before the physicians became involved.89  
Documents also described contracts between Merck employees and medical 
publishing companies providing for ghostwriting, reviews, and recruitment 
of external physician as authors.90  Merck compensated some physicians who 
agreed to serve as authors of ghostwritten manuscripts with honoraria ranging 
from $750 to $2500.91 
Another example of how the consequences of ghostwriting are not known 
until thousands of patients’ lives are negatively affected involves Wyeth’s 
treatment of its hormone drugs.  Documents unveiled during litigation show 
that Wyeth paid ghostwriters to produce twenty-six articles that were 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. After spending only a few years on the market, Vioxx was voluntarily pulled after 
outside researchers continuously raised the possibility that Vioxx might be a danger to the 
heart, linking the painkiller to an increased risk of heart attacks, strokes, and deaths. See Alex 
Berenson et al., Despite Warnings, Drug Giant Took Long Path to Vioxx Recall, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 14, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/14/business/despite-warnings-drug-giant-
took-long-path-to-vioxx-recall.html [https://perma.cc/978Q-B8SF]. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See Bloomberg News, F.D.A. Releases Memo on Vioxx, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2004), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/03/business/fda-releases-memo-on-vioxx.html 
[https://perma.cc/644W-M2ET]. 
 87. See generally Joseph S. Ross et al., Guest Authorship and Ghostwriting in 
Publications Related to Rofecoxib:  A Case Study of Industry Documents from Rofecoxib 
Litigation, 299 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1800 (2008). 
 88. Id. at 1801–02.  Specifically, a Merck employee was found to be the author of the first 
draft of the manuscript; however, in the published articles, the first author was an external, 
academically affiliated investigator. Id. at 1803.  
 89. Id. at 1802. 
 90. Id. at 1803–04. 
 91. Id. at 1806. 
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published in eighteen medical journals between 1998 and 2005.92  These 
articles emphasized the benefits and deemphasized the risks of its hormone 
drugs without disclosing Wyeth’s role in initiating or financing the studies.93  
The true nature of these risks, however, were disclosed to the public after a 
2002 federally funded study found that the hormones increased the risk of 
breast cancer, heart disease, and stroke in menopausal women, leading to the 
filing of nearly 8000 lawsuits.94 
Practices like those of Merck and Wyeth led to a report by the Senate 
Finance Committee, helmed by Senator Charles Grassley, that described a 
two-year investigation into pharmaceutical industry influence over academia 
and medical ghostwriting.95  The report found that, despite past litigation 
exposing ghostwriting, pharmaceutical companies’ role in medical 
publications remained veiled or undisclosed.96  The report also focused on 
academia, finding that, while their ability to detect ghostwriting is limited, 
only a small number of major medical schools have explicitly banned the 
practice.97  Similarly, it found that journal criteria on authorship requirements 
had a limited effect on ghostwriting despite journals’ explicit prohibition of 
the practice.98 
Dr. Joseph S. Ross, an assistant professor at Mount Sinai School of 
Medicine, likened the practice of medical ghostwriting to “steroids and 
baseball,” stating, “You don’t know who was using and who wasn’t; you 
don’t know which articles are tainted and which aren’t.”99  Ghostwriting 
raises concerns for physicians who rely on medical literature to inform their 
practice.  Because patient care is guided by these publications, this Note 
explores ways to ensure the validity of the literature used by prescribing 
physicians.  While regulatory reform of the current medical publication 
framework will be addressed, the practice of ghostwriting presents an 
opportunity for a litigatory approach to the issue. 
D.  The Potential for Legal Action 
Against Medical Ghostwriting 
Although the practice of ghostwriting is well known in the medical 
community, the legal world has been slow to address the issue.  With few 
legal avenues available and no precedent to support a claim, two law 
 
 92. See Singer, supra note 67.  
 93. See id.; see also Duff Wilson, Wyeth’s Use of Medical Ghostwriters Questioned, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 12, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/13/business/13wyeth.html 
[https://perma.cc/FZ8S-EYM6] (explaining that documents revealed a “publication plan 
tracking report” by Wyeth showing “articles in which manuscripts were completed by the 
company before they were sent to the putative author for review, and any revisions were 
subject to final approval from the company”). 
 94. See Singer, supra note 67.  
 95. See generally GRASSLEY REPORT, supra note 66.  
 96. See id. at 4–7. 
 97. See id. at 7–11.  Out of the ten leading medical schools the report examined, six had 
policies explicitly prohibiting ghostwriting:  Columbia, Johns Hopkins, Stanford, University 
of California, San Francisco, University of Washington, and Washington University. Id. at 7.  
 98. See id. at 11–14. 
 99. See Singer, supra note 67. 
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professors published an article that proposed using civil RICO to combat 
ghostwriting.100  At first glance, RICO seems an unlikely statute to be 
discussed in the same breath as medical publishing, but an understanding of 
civil RICO’s application and history can help to illustrate how the statute can 
be applied to areas beyond traditional organized crime. 
Congress enacted RICO as part of Title IX of the Organized Crime Control 
Act of 1970 (OCCA) to combat the influence of organized crime on interstate 
commerce.101  The statute provides for both criminal and civil penalties for 
acts performed as part of an ongoing criminal enterprise.102  RICO permits 
the government and private plaintiffs to bring civil actions in either state or 
federal court,103 and, under § 1964(c), is available to “[a]ny person injured in 
his business or property by reason of a violation” of RICO.104  Those found 
civilly liable must pay treble damages, as well as attorney’s fees and costs.105  
The availability of treble damages, combined with the statute’s broad and 
liberal construction, has turned civil RICO into the weapon of choice for 
plaintiffs.  It has the potential to serve as a valuable tool for medical 
ghostwriting plaintiffs as well. 
II.  PUBLICATION BIAS AS 
A VIOLATION OF CIVIL RICO 
Though it was first enacted in response to growing crime syndicates, civil 
RICO has been stretched to areas far beyond traditional organized crime.  
This Part explores how a broad application of RICO could include medical 
ghostwriting.  Part II.A describes how, historically, the pharmaceutical 
industry has been held liable for medical ghostwriting, while individual 
physicians have escaped liability.  Next, Part II.B examines the history of 
RICO and the support for a liberal interpretation of the statute.  Finally, Part 
II.C discusses the elements under § 1962(c) that a plaintiff must prove to 
pursue a successful RICO claim and applies those elements to the practice of 
medical ghostwriting.   
A.  The Sole Wrongdoer: 
 Pharmaceutical Industry Is Held Liable 
The Glaxo, Merck, and Wyeth examples demonstrate that issues of 
publication bias are only brought to light after public health has been 
 
 100. See generally Simon Stern & Trudo Lemmens, Legal Remedies for Medical 
Ghostwriting:  Imposing Fraud Liability on Guest Authors of Ghostwritten Articles, PLOS 
MED., Aug. 2011. 
 101. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).  
 102. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963–1964 (2012).  RICO may provide equitable relief through 
divestiture of the defendant’s interest in the enterprise, restrictions on the defendant’s future 
activities or investments, and dissolution or reorganization of the enterprise. Id. § 1964(a). 
 103. Id. § 1964(b)–(c); see also Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) (holding that 
state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over claims arising under § 1964(c)).  
 104. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). 
 105. A successful plaintiff may recover three times the damages sustained and the cost of 
the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee. Id.   
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compromised.  Typically, however, the manufacturer is held solely 
responsible for its wrongdoing, as healthcare fraud allegations and 
subsequent payouts are commonplace in the pharmaceutical world.106  For 
example, in addition to paying $4.85 billion to settle thousands of personal 
injury suits, Merck paid $950 million and pleaded guilty to a criminal 
misdemeanor charge for its illegal promotion107 of Vioxx to treat rheumatoid 
arthritis before the FDA approved it for that purpose.108  Merck also faced 
civil claims under the False Claims Act for making false statements to state 
Medicaid agencies about Vioxx’s cardiovascular safety and for making 
“inaccurate, unsupported, or misleading” statements to increase sales of the 
drug, resulting in payments by the federal government.109  Most recently, 
Merck settled a securities class action suit brought by its shareholders for 
$830 million.110  Although the total costs to Merck exceed $6 billion, 
litigation of this nature is viewed merely as “a cost of doing business.”111  
Further, while publishing bias necessarily functions as a factor in these 
claims, neither selective publishing nor ghostwriting were identified as acts 
of fraudulent behavior.  And, perhaps most alarmingly, no individual was 
held responsible. 
Noticeably absent from litigation involving the pharmaceutical industry is 
any mention of the physicians who agreed to author ghostwritten papers.  
While the pharmaceutical industry is surely at fault for facilitating the 
drafting of the articles, the authors who fail to fulfill authorship criteria 
should also face legal liability. 
B.  A Liberal Interpretation of Civil RICO 
Facilitates Its Broad Application 
An examination of RICO’s legislative and judicial history is essential to 
understanding how civil RICO can stretch beyond traditional organized 
crime to apply to medical publishing. 
 
 106. In 2011, the Wall Street Journal stated that a recent Merck settlement was the “latest 
big payout by a drug company to settle health-care fraud allegations,” noting that 
GlaxoSmithKline PLC, Pfizer Inc., Eli Lilly & Co., and AstraZeneca PLC have also reached 
costly settlements in recent years. See Peter Loftus & Brent Kendall, Merck to Pay $950 
Million in Vioxx Settlement, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 23, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10001424052970204531404577054472253737682 [https://perma.cc/5UY2-GU4X].  
 107. Under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, manufacturers are prohibited from marketing 
drugs for any uses except those the FDA has determined are safe. See 21 U.S.C. § 331 (2012). 
 108. See Duff Wilson, Merck to Pay $950 Million Over Vioxx, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/23/business/merck-agrees-to-pay-950-million-in-vioxx-
case.html [https://perma.cc/79CW-XMPC]. 
 109. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Announces Nearly $1 Billion 
Civil and Criminal Resolution with Merck Sharp and Dohme Over Promotion of Vioxx (Nov. 
22, 2011), http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/CriminalInvestigations/ucm280985.htm 
[https://perma.cc/A7HR-G7QQ]. 
 110. See Peter Loftus, Merck to Pay $830 Million to Settle Vioxx Shareholder Suit, WALL 
ST. J. (Jan. 15, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/merck-to-pay-830-million-to-settle-vioxx-
shareholder-suit-1452866882 [https://perma.cc/ADY8-JL8V]. 
 111. See Wilson, supra note 108. 
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1.  Legislative History 
This Part explores civil RICO’s legislative history by dividing it into two 
time periods of statutory construction surrounding the enactment of 
§ 1962(c):  preliberalization and postliberalization. 
Congress originally enacted RICO to combat the criminal infiltration of 
American business and trade.112  By the 1950s, concern about the national 
reach of crime syndicates became pervasive, leading Congress to investigate 
the nature of these networks.113  The congressional investigations revealed 
for the first time that the suspected crime syndicates were operating through 
infiltration, a novel form of criminal activity in which the profits of organized 
crime were used to buy and operate legitimate business enterprises, reaching 
across almost every business sector.114  These alarming results led to the 
establishment of the Commission on Law Enforcement and the 
Administration of Justice, which issued a task report focusing on the 
organized nature of the crime syndicates rather than trying to prevent 
individual crimes from occurring.115  This focus on the infiltration of 
legitimate business proved foundational for RICO, spurring a series of 
legislative measures that eventually led to the statute’s enactment.116 
The original legislation that evolved into RICO attempted to punish either 
the investment of illegitimate profits into legitimate businesses or the 
acquisition of an interest in legitimate businesses by illegitimate means.117  
Recognizing that the imprisonment of an organized crime leader did not 
eradicate a syndicate, RICO targeted the economic base to drain the 
organization’s source of income.118  This purpose is explicit in the first two 
substantive crimes created by RICO.  Section 1962(a) prohibits the use of 
income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity to acquire an interest 
in an enterprise.119  Section 1962(b) prohibits the acquisition or maintenance 
of an interest in or control of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering 
activity.120 
Congress radically expanded RICO beyond its original intent with the 
addition of subsection (c),121 which made it a crime not only to acquire an 
enterprise by racketeering but also to conduct the affairs of an enterprise by 
 
 112. See, e.g., 115 CONG. REC. 9569 (1969) (noting the Senate Committee’s determination 
that “organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and 
widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America’s economy”). 
 113. Miranda Lievsay, Note, Containing the Uncontainable:  Drawing RICO’s Border with 
the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1735, 1739 (2016). 
 114. Id. at 1739–40.  Major industries such as banking and insurance, as well as small 
businesses such as restaurants and hotels were involved in this infiltration. Id. at 1740. 
 115. Id. at 1740. 
 116. Id. at 1741. 
 117. Gerard E. Lynch, A Conceptual, Practical, and Political Guide to RICO Reform, 43 
VAND. L. REV. 769, 770, 773 (1990) (dismantling the myth that the original package of 
legislation was aimed at punishing membership in organized crime).  
 118. Lievsay, supra note 113, at 1741. 
 119. Lynch, supra note 117, at 770; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)–(b) (2012). 
 120. Lynch, supra note 117, at 770; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b). 
 121. Lynch, supra note 117, at 774. 
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a pattern of racketeering.122  Thus, § 1962(c) makes anyone who engages in 
a pattern of criminal acts while managing any legitimate enterprise guilty of 
a RICO offense.123  While the other provisions have limited application, 
§ 1962(c) “has proved almost infinitely adaptable” and has been used in the 
overwhelming majority of RICO cases.124 
Since the inception of § 1962(c), courts have broadly interpreted RICO to 
include defendants who do not fit the conventional conception of a 
participant in organized crime.  Rather than curtail this judicial interpretation, 
Congress extensively revised RICO in 1984 to broaden the law, including the 
addition of forfeiture provisions.125  By this time, the use of RICO in white-
collar and political corruption cases, as well as the widespread use of civil 
RICO, was well established.126  While today’s uses may not have been 
foreseeable, Congress was aware of RICO’s application beyond traditional 
notions of organized crime when it revised the law in 1984.127 
The liberal construction clause of the OCCA, section 904(a), further 
supports a broad interpretation by expressly providing that “[t]he provisions 
of [RICO] shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.”128  
Adding strength to this directive is the fact that no other statute in the U.S. 
Code that imposes criminal penalties mandates liberal construction.129  Thus, 
this congressional directive specifically requires courts to adopt a liberal 
approach when construing ambiguities within RICO.130  Despite its rather 
clear instruction, this clause has been met with some resistance.131  The early 
history of civil RICO is marked by certain courts’ unwillingness to apply the 
statute to cases involving persons other than the stereotypical “mobster.”132 
2.  The Liberal Judicial Interpretation 
The unwillingness to use RICO broadly came to a halt after the U.S. 
Supreme Court undertook the task of clarifying the scope of civil RICO, 
heeding the congressional mandate.  The Supreme Court specifically 
 
 122. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). 
 123. Lynch, supra note 117, at 774. 
 124. Id.  Section 1962(d) prohibits conspiracy to violate any of the three preceding 
subsections and is also often used. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d).   
 125. Lynch, supra note 117, at 775. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Under the doctrine of legislative acquiescence, Congress’s failure to enact opposing 
legislation is an indication of its implied agreement with the statute’s interpretation. See, e.g., 
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 601 (1983) (“Congress’ failure to act on the 
bills proposed on this subject provides added support for concluding that Congress acquiesced 
in the IRS rulings . . . .”). 
 128. 21 U.S.C. § 853(o) (2012). 
 129. Craig W. Palm, RICO and the Liberal Construction Clause, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 167, 
168 n.6 (1980). 
 130. Id. at 175 (finding no constitutional impediments to the express liberal construction 
mandate). 
 131. For a general discussion of the principles of statutory construction and the controversy 
over the constitutionality of the liberal construction clause, see id. 
 132. Anne Melley, The Stretching of Civil RICO:  Pro-Life Demonstrators Are 
Racketeers?, 56 UMKC L. REV. 287, 291 (1988) (discussing the judicial interpretation of civil 
RICO).  
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addressed the liberal construction clause in United States v. Turkette,133 
where the Court considered whether the term “enterprise” as used in RICO 
encompasses both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises.  While the Court 
determined that the plain language and structure of the statute did not limit 
its application to legitimate enterprises, it nevertheless followed the directive 
set forth in section 904(a) of the OCCA.134  Using legislative history as 
guidance, the Court determined that RICO was both a preventive and 
remedial measure to deal with organized crime infiltrating legitimate 
businesses and should be interpreted to include a broader definition of 
“enterprise.”135 
Following suit, the Court in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.136 reiterated that 
RICO should be read broadly.  Rejecting the Second Circuit’s narrow reading 
of the statute, the Court refused to find that a criminal conviction on the 
underlying predicate offenses was a prerequisite to bringing a civil RICO 
action.137  The Court also refused to require a “racketeering injury” separate 
from the harm from the predicate acts.138  At the end of its opinion, the Court 
recognized that civil RICO had evolved into something different from its 
original conception and that almost all actions were being brought against 
defendants other than the “archetypal, intimidating mobster.”139  Yet, the 
Court concluded that this “defect—if defect it is—is inherent in the statute as 
written, and its correction must lie with Congress.”140 
The Supreme Court’s liberal pronouncement of civil RICO’s application 
has made it “a formidable weapon for plaintiffs in civil litigation” and has 
fostered widespread application of the statute to matters beyond traditional 
organized crime.141  For example, in 1989, a women’s health center 
successfully instituted a private civil RICO action against antiabortion 
protesters.142  Despite the defendants’ argument that the center’s application 
of RICO exceeded the statute’s purpose, the Third Circuit held that civil 
 
 133. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).  The enterprise in this case was a group of individuals associated-
in-fact for the purpose of engaging in criminal activities, including arson, insurance fraud, and 
illegal trafficking in drugs. Id. at 579. 
 134. Id. at 580–87; see also 21 U.S.C. § 853(o) (2012). 
 135. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 588–93; see also H.J. Inc., v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 
(1989) (reiterating that RICO was broadly written to encompass a wide range of criminal 
activity and noting that narrow construction of the statute would be contrary to congressional 
intent). 
 136. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).  In this case, the Court adjudicated a dispute over a joint venture 
in which Sedima alleged the respondent presented inflated bills, cheating Sedima out of a 
portion of its proceeds by collecting for nonexistent expenses. Id. at 483. 
 137. Id. at 493.  
 138. Id. at 495.  
 139. Id. at 499–500.  
 140. Id. at 499. 
 141. Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961 et seq.—Supreme Court 
Cases, 171 A.L.R. Fed. 1st, § 2 (2001). 
 142. See generally Ne. Women’s Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(holding that activists could be liable under RICO for their intimidation and harassment of the 
center resulting in destruction of its property).  
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RICO could appropriately be applied to the defendants’ intimidation and 
harassment.143 
3.  Civil RICO Efforts to Combat Health-Care Fraud 
Using civil RICO to combat health-care fraud is not novel.144  Since 2010, 
civil RICO has been repeatedly employed in class action suits against 
pharmaceutical companies,145 allowing for further expansion of the statute’s 
application.  These cases provide significant guidance for plaintiffs who sue 
pharmaceutical companies under civil RICO.146  Although this Note seeks to 
place civil RICO liability on authors involved in publishing bias rather than 
pharmaceutical companies, this guidance is useful insofar as it stresses the 
importance of the theory of liability.147 
In UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co.,148 a number of unions and insurers 
brought a putative class action against Eli Lilly claiming civil RICO 
predicated on mail fraud and conspiracy to violate RICO.149  These claims 
were based on the plaintiffs’ contention that Eli Lilly made false statements 
and omitted material information concerning the safety and efficacy of its 
drug, Zyprexa, including disseminating false information about the drug’s 
risks.150 
The plaintiffs alleged a chain of causation in which Lilly distributed 
misinformation about Zyprexa that the physicians relied upon in prescribing 
the drug, which caused the plaintiffs, as third-party payors (TTPs), to 
overpay.151  However, the Second Circuit found that this narrative “obscures 
the more attenuated link between the alleged misrepresentations made to 
doctors and the ultimate injury.”152  It fails to consider that the TTPs relied 
on advice from other parties to place Zyprexa on their lists of approved 
medications and then failed to negotiate the drug’s price below the level set 
 
 143. Id. at 1357.  The court found that the defendants’ description of their conduct as “civil 
disobedience” did not immunize them from statutes that prohibit the very acts that the 
defendants were found to have committed and that the tangible damage to the center’s medical 
equipment resulting from the protesters’ forcible entry was all that RICO required to establish 
injury. Id. at 1348–49.  
 144. See Pamela Bucy Pierson, RICO Trends:  From Gangsters to Class Actions, 65 S.C. 
L. REV. 213, 258 (2013) (noting that more than half of RICO class actions allege some type of 
health-care fraud). 
 145. See, e.g., Ironworkers Local Union 68 v. AstraZeneca Pharm., LP, 634 F.3d 1352, 
1357 (11th Cir. 2011); UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., 620 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 2010); 
United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa. & Reg’l Health & Welfare Fund v. Amgen, 
Inc., 400 F. App’x 255, 256 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 146. See Pierson, supra note 144, at 256. 
 147. See id. 
 148. 620 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 149. Id. at 121–37. 
 150. Id. at 129.  Plaintiffs argued that they were injured by paying for Zyprexa prescriptions 
that (1) would not have been issued but for the alleged misrepresentations and (2) that were at 
a higher price than would have been charged absent the alleged misrepresentations. Id. at 123.  
 151. Id. at 134.  
 152. Id.  
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by Eli Lilly, leading to overpayment.153  Thus, the chain of causation “rests 
on the independent actions of third and even fourth parties,” and therefore 
must fail.154 
Similarly, in Southeast Laborers Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer 
Corp.,155 a welfare fund, which reimbursed plan members for covered 
medical expenses, brought a RICO class action against Bayer.  The complaint 
alleged that Bayer, aware of the adverse effects of its drug, Trasylol, launched 
an aggressive marketing campaign containing false or misleading statements 
to justify the drug’s price of over $1000 per dose.156  The Eleventh Circuit 
held that the fund failed to explain how or why Bayer’s alleged suppression 
of information caused it to pay for Trasylol.157  That is, the fund failed to 
demonstrate that it would have independently determined that the drug was 
not “medically necessary”—a requirement for payment—if Bayer had 
disclosed the allegedly suppressed information.158  If the fund had stated facts 
plausibly demonstrating that it would not have bought Trasylol had it known 
the true information, a direct relation would have been established.  Without 
such facts, the complaint failed to meet the direct relation requirement.159 
While the courts above found the plaintiffs’ injuries too attenuated to 
constitute proximate cause, this issue can be avoided.  This Note focuses on 
a class of plaintiffs—the medical journal and its subscribers—who are 
directly injured by publication bias and whose rights may be vindicated by 
civil RICO. 
C.  Elements of Civil RICO and Their Applicability 
to Medical Ghostwriting 
Medical journals publish articles that fail to accurately represent the results 
of clinical trials, which are ghostwritten by outside companies and authored 
by prominent physicians.160  Because the medical journals do not intend to 
publish misleading information, they cannot have the requisite intent 
necessary to withstand an allegation of fraud under civil RICO.  Even so, the 
physicians who sign their names to articles they had little to no part in 
drafting may have the required intent.  This Part applies the elements of civil 
RICO to physicians who sign on to ghostwritten articles and considers 
whether such a theory is viable. 
 
 153. Id.  The court found that the evidence in the record supported the conclusion that 
prescribing doctors generally do not consider the price of a medication when deciding what to 
prescribe for an individual patient. Id. at 133–34.  Thus, any reliance by doctors on 
misrepresentations as to the efficacy and side effects of a drug was not a but for cause of the 
price that TTPs ultimately paid for each prescription. Id.  
 154. See id. at 134 (quoting Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 11 (2010)). 
 155. 444 F. App’x 401 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 156. Id. at 403.  
 157. Id. at 410.  
 158. See id.  
 159. Id.  
 160. See supra Part I.C.  
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1.  Who Can Bring the Civil RICO Claim? 
To bring suit in federal court, plaintiffs must have standing.161  “Standing” 
refers to whether a litigant is entitled to have a court decide the merits of the 
particular issue or dispute.162  While a claim may have merit, the claimant 
may nevertheless be denied access to the courts because he or she is not the 
proper party to bring the suit.163  In that case, the claimant lacks standing. 
The plain language of civil RICO permits “[a]ny person” injured to bring 
a claim.164  This general grant of statutory standing, combined with the 
statute’s plaintiff-enticing treble damages, caused courts to fashion a variety 
of standing requirements intending to limit access to the federal courts.165 
In Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.,166 the Supreme Court 
established proximate cause as the appropriate standard for civil RICO 
standing.167  This standard demands that the plaintiff prove a direct relation 
between the asserted injury and the alleged conduct.168  It is not enough to 
allege that a defendant’s acts were the but-for cause of a plaintiff’s injuries.169   
The Court used the proximate cause standard to permit the flexible judicial 
tools in determining a person’s responsibility for the consequences of that 
person’s actions.170  The Court noted that its concept of proximate cause 
reflected both a notion of justice and judicial convenience.171  The direct 
relation requirement is a central element because when injury is less direct, 
(1) it becomes more difficult to “ascertain the amount of a plaintiff’s damages 
attributable to the violation, as distinct from other, independent, factors”; (2) 
courts are forced “to adopt complicated rules apportioning damages among 
plaintiffs removed at different levels of injury from the violative acts”; and 
(3) an interest in deterring injurious conduct is not justified because “directly 
injured victims can generally be counted on to vindicate the law as private 
attorneys general” without incurring the problems faced by remotely injured 
plaintiffs.172  The Court determined that focusing upon the direct relationship 
 
 161. Ryan C. Morris, Proximate Cause and Civil RICO Standing:  The Narrowly 
Restrictive and Mechanical Approach in Lerner v. Fleet Bank and Baisch v. Gallina, 2004 
BYU L. REV. 739, 745.  
 162. Morris, supra note 161, at 745.  
 163. Id. at 746.  
 164. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2012). 
 165. See Morris, supra note 162, at 755–59. 
 166. 503 U.S. 258 (1992). 
 167. Id. at 268; see also, e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 481 (1985) 
(rejecting the argument that RICO claims could only be brought against defendants convicted 
of criminal charges who sustained a racketeering injury, which was distinct from the injury 
occurring as a result of the predicate acts themselves).  
 168. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268.  Looking to RICO’S legislative history, the Supreme Court 
found it significant that the Clayton Act, upon which RICO was based, was interpreted at the 
time of RICO’s enactment as requiring proximate cause. Id. at 267.  The Court reasoned that 
Congress knew of this interpretation when it passed RICO and thus intended for proximate 
cause to be required to prevail on a RICO claim. Id. at 268. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id.  
 171. Id.  
 172. Id. at 269–70. 
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between the conduct and the harm avoids these complications.173  This direct 
relation requirement prevents uncertain inquiries from overrunning RICO 
litigation.174 
A direct relationship may be shown where a plaintiff is able to demonstrate 
that factors other than the alleged RICO conduct did not contribute to her 
injury.175  While this establishes a high standard for the plaintiff to meet, it is 
not necessary for the plaintiff to prove she relied on the alleged predicate 
acts.176  The statute’s broad language of “any person” suggests a “breadth of 
coverage not easily reconciled with an implicit requirement that the plaintiff 
show reliance in addition to injury.”177  Thus, proximate cause requires only 
a showing that someone relied on the defendant’s misrepresentation leading 
directly to the plaintiff’s injury.178 
Section 1964(c) requires a person to be “injured in his business or 
property.”179  While society should be most concerned with the physical 
injury to patients resulting from treatment decisions influenced by medical 
literature, this injury is too attenuated from the alleged fraud to satisfy 
RICO’s standing requirement.180  Instead, the direct injury resulting from 
fraudulent authorship is to the medical journal and its subscribers.181  The 
harm to the medical journal involves the cost of publishing the fraudulent 
article.182  The harm to the subscribers involves the monetary value of the 
journal subscription containing the fraudulently authored article.183 
A journal subscription price184 represents a compilation of articles that 
adhere to the journal’s guidelines, since the journal would refuse to publish 
an article if it were known that the article failed to meet its publication 
 
 173. Id.  
 174. See Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 460 (2006) (declining to find 
proximate cause after finding that the direct victim of the alleged RICO violation involving 
tax fraud was the State of New York, not the plaintiff, and further, plaintiff’s loss of market 
share could have been caused by a number of factors independent of the alleged tax fraud). 
 175. See id. at 459.  
 176. See Bridge v. Phx. Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 657–58 (2008) (finding that 
first-party reliance is not necessary to ensure that there is a sufficiently direct relationship 
between the defendant’s wrongful conduct and the plaintiff’s injury to satisfy the proximate 
cause principles).  
 177. Id. at 649.  
 178. See id. at 659. 
 179. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2012). 
 180. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 181. Although there is also reputational harm to the medical journal itself, such harm is 
considered a personal injury and is therefore not an injury recognized under civil RICO.  See, 
e.g., Santana v. Cook Cty. Bd. of Review, 679 F.3d 614, 623 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that 
statements, which may amount to defamation under state law, do not advance a viable claim 
under § 1964(c), even if the defamation results in a loss of income).  
 182. With annual revenue of $9.4 billion in 2011, analysts estimate profit margins at 20–
30 percent for the science-publishing industry, so the average cost to the publisher of 
producing an article is likely to be around $3500 to $4000. See Richard Van Noorden, Open 
Access:  The True Cost of Science Publishing, 495 NATURE 426, 427 (2013).  
 183. See Stern & Lemmens, supra note 100, at 3.  
 184. For example, an annual regular membership to the American Medical Association, 
which grants access to JAMA, is $420 for physicians. See AMA MEMBERSHIP DUES, 
https://www.ama-assn.org/membership/ama-membership-dues [https://perma.cc/TT4L-
2D9D] (last visited Sept. 21, 2017). 
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requirements.  However, an author’s false claim of authorship deceives the 
journal into believing the article has met authorship requirements and induces 
the journal to publish the article, thereby occupying valuable journal 
space.185  The subscribers then lose the opportunity to read a legitimate article 
that satisfies the journal’s publication requirements, diminishing subscription 
value.186  The plaintiffs would only need to allege facts showing that the 
ghostwritten article was fraudulently authored and subsequently published in 
a journal that the subscribers paid for.187  While the individual claim of a 
subscriber or medical journal may be insignificant, treble damages for the 
aggregate claims of all subscribers and the medical journal have the potential 
to be substantial.188 
Failure to allege a viable theory of proximate cause has been the downfall 
of civil RICO actions by medical journals against pharmaceutical 
companies.189  To prevail on proximate causation, the medical journal must 
show a direct relationship between the cost of publication and the physician’s 
alleged fraudulent authorship.  Specifically, it must demonstrate that it would 
not have published the article had it known of the fraudulent authorship.  
Fraudulently authored articles fail to meet journals’ publication requirements 
and therefore would not be considered for publication, providing useful 
support for this theory. 
Likewise, the subscribers must sufficiently allege a direct relationship 
between their overpayment for the medical journal subscription and the 
physician’s alleged fraudulent authorship.  The subscribers must demonstrate 
that they would not have paid the same price for a journal that contains a 
fraudulent article as they would have for a journal that contains articles that 
meet authorship requirements.  Stern and Lemmens argue that knowledge of 
ghostwriting undermines the ghostwritten article’s credibility.190  Because 
these articles have the potential to influence treatment decisions, an article 
with less credibility is necessarily less valuable to the reading physician.  Yet 
it is irrelevant whether the subscriber even reads the fraudulent article.191  
The fraudulent article replaces a more creditable article that would have 
conformed to the journal’s requirements, thereby depriving the subscriber of 
the full value of the subscription.192 
Additionally, the subscribers do not have to demonstrate that they relied 
on the fraudulent authorship due to the Supreme Court holding that civil 
RICO does not require the plaintiff to show first-hand reliance.193  The direct 
relationship between the plaintiffs’ injury and the physician’s fraudulent 
conduct is clear:  a physician fraudulently authors an article that is 
subsequently published by a journal, thereby decreasing the value of the 
 
 185. See Stern & Lemmens, supra note 100, at 3.  
 186. See id. 
 187. See id. at 4. 
 188. See id. at 3. 
 189. See, e.g., supra Part II.B.3.  
 190. See Stern & Lemmens, supra note 100, at 3. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. See supra notes 175–83 and accompanying text.   
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journal subscription. The plaintiffs, therefore, have the requisite proximate 
cause standing required under § 1962(c) to bring a claim against the 
physicians for decreasing the value of the journal subscription.   
2.  The Elements of Civil RICO 
RICO’s operative section sets forth four substantive offenses prohibiting 
forms of enterprise activity.194  Along with at least one substantive offense, 
a civil RICO violation requires, by a preponderance of the evidence, a 
showing of (1) a person participating in (2) a pattern of racketeering activity 
(3) in connection with the acquisition, maintenance, conduct, or control of an 
enterprise.195 
a.  Racketeering Activity 
An act of “racketeering activity” is the predicate act that forms the 
foundation of a civil RICO claim.  The plaintiff must first prove the elements 
of the crime alleged as the racketeering activity.  Congress defined 
“racketeering activity” as any act “chargeable” under state or federal law, any 
act “indictable” under federal criminal provisions, and any offense under 
federal law involving bankruptcy fraud, securities fraud, or drug-related 
activities.196  This includes a vast list of prohibited acts that Congress has 
incorporated by reference in the requisite provision.197  In particular, mail 
fraud and wire fraud are included in the statutory definition,198 helping to 
facilitate the expansive application of civil RICO in litigation. 
With regard to medical ghostwriting, the predicate act that forms the 
foundation of a plaintiff’s civil RICO claim is mail fraud.199  Mail fraud 
occurs whenever a person, “having devised or intending to devise any scheme 
or artifice to defraud” uses the mail “for the purpose of executing such 
scheme or artifice or attempting so to do.”200  In interpreting this statute, the 
Supreme Court held that any mailing that is incident to a fraudulent scheme 
satisfies the mailing element.201  Further, the plaintiff does not need to prove 
intent or that the defendant engaged in the physical act of mailing.202  It is 
sufficient that the defendant knew or should have known that the use of the 
mail would follow in the ordinary course of business.203 
Here, a physician who authored an article she did not significantly 
contribute to had a scheme to defraud plaintiffs.  Indeed, a physician agrees 
 
 194. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)–(d) (2012). 
 195. Id. § 1962(c); see also Lievsay, supra note 113, at 1742.  
 196. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).  
 197. See id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341. 
 200. Id. 
 201. See Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954) (holding that the mail fraud statute 
was violated where a scheme to defraud was established and the mailing of a check by the 
bank was an “essential part of that scheme”).  
 202. Id. at 8–9.  
 203. Id.  
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to authorship so the journal and its readers believe that the physician 
significantly contributed to the work illustrated in the publication.  This is 
precisely what the warranty of authorship conveys.  The scheme to defraud 
is bolstered by the potential impact publication has on a physician’s career.204  
The recognition and prestige that flow from publication incent a physician to 
make others believe she contributed substantially to a published work.  Even 
if a defendant-physician did not physically mail the fraudulently authored 
publication, she would have known journals would be mailed to subscribers 
in the ordinary course.  In fact, authorship only becomes meaningful to a 
physician once it is disseminated to the public.  Therefore, the mailing, as a 
way to convey this information to the public, is not merely incidental—it is 
essential to the fraudulent scheme.205 
As a procedural matter, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), the act 
of mail fraud must be alleged with particularity.206  To satisfy this rule, a 
plaintiff must identify the statements or representations made by the 
defendant that were actually false or misleading at the time they were 
made.207  Thus, rather than broadly alleging that a physician engaged in 
fraudulent authorship, plaintiffs must point to the specific articles that contain 
fraudulent authorship to satisfy Rule 9(b). 
b.  Pattern of Racketeering Activity 
A defendant’s engagement in racketeering activity is not enough to satisfy 
the statute.  RICO further requires that a defendant act through a “pattern of 
racketeering activity.”208  Congress defined “pattern of racketeering activity” 
as “at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after 
[October 15, 1970] and the last of which occurred within ten years . . . after 
the commission of a prior act.”209  Thus, every RICO claim must involve at 
least two predicate acts occurring within ten years. 
While it was generally accepted that the commission of any two predicate 
acts constituted a pattern, the Supreme Court in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex 
Co.210 expressed in dicta its dissatisfaction with courts’ broad construction 
of the pattern requirement.211  In a footnote that ultimately did little to guide 
 
 204. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 205. Today, articles published in medical journals are often available on a journal’s 
website, changing the predicate act from mail fraud to wire fraud. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) 
(2012). 
 206. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
 207. See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa. & Reg’l Health & Welfare 
Fund v. Amgen, Inc., 400 F. App’x 255, 256 (9th Cir. 2010).  Here, a welfare fund alleged 
that the defendant pharmaceutical company violated RICO by engaging in deceptive 
advertising that misrepresented the safety of off-label uses. Id. at 257.  The court held that the 
plaintiff failed to plead its allegations of fraud under RICO, emphasizing that a mere assertion 
that a company promoted its drug for ineffective or unapproved uses will not satisfy Rule 9(b). 
Id.  Instead, the plaintiff must point to specific misrepresentations made by the defendant. Id. 
at 257–58. 
 208. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a).  
 209. Id. § 1961(5).  
 210. 473 U.S. 479 (1985). 
 211. Id. at 496 n.14. 
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lower courts,212 the Court attempted to refine RICO by holding that the 
predicate acts must show continuity and relatedness.213  These two prongs 
were later clarified in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.214  
Because Congress was concerned with long-term concerted criminal 
conduct, the Court held that the pattern requirement necessitates (1) a 
relationship between activities, established by a series of factors215 and (2) 
the threat of continuing activity.216  Because most predicate acts are 
sufficiently related, the continuity prong frequently proves most challenging 
to a plaintiff asserting a civil RICO claim. 
The key factor in determining whether the threat of continuing activity 
exists is the duration of the alleged racketeering activity.217  The prong is 
adequately pleaded only where the plaintiff has alleged “closed-ended” or 
“open-ended” continuity, referring to either a closed period of repeated 
conduct or to past conduct that by its nature projects a threat of future 
repetition.218  To demonstrate continuity over a closed period, the plaintiff 
must provide a series of related predicates that have extended over a 
substantial period of time.219  Acts extending over a few weeks or months, 
without the threat of future criminal conduct, will not satisfy the 
requirement.220  In fact, even two years of related predicates may not be long 
enough to constitute continuity.221 
While closed-ended continuity is primarily a temporal concept, courts 
consider a number of factors in determining whether the requirement is 
met.222  The factors include the number and variety of predicate acts, the 
 
 212. Patrick J. Ryan, Note, The Civil RICO Pattern Requirement:  Continuity and 
Relationship, a Fatal Attraction?, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 955, 964 (1988).  For a discussion of 
the lower courts’ confusion over what constitutes a pattern within the meaning of § 1962(c) 
that spawned from Sedima, see id. at 64–65.  
 213. See Sedima, S.P.R.L., 473 U.S. at 496 n.14.  
 214. 492 U.S. 229 (1989). 
 215. See id. at 239–40.  The Court turned to another provision of the OCCA, Title X, where 
“pattern” was defined as “acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, 
victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing 
characteristics and are not isolated events” and determined that there was no reason to believe 
RICO’s pattern component required a more “constrained” notion of relationship. Id. 
 216. See id. at 240 (“RICO’s legislative history tells us, however, that the relatedness of 
racketeering activities is not alone enough to satisfy § 1962’s pattern element.  To establish a 
RICO pattern it must also be shown that the predicates themselves amount to, or that they 
otherwise constitute a threat of, continuing racketeering activity.”). 
 217. See Pierson, supra note 144, at 230 (discussing the importance of longevity in 
establishing a pattern under RICO). 
 218. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 241 (asserting that “continuity is both a closed-ended and open-
ended concept”).  
 219. Id. at 242.  
 220. Id.  
 221. See, e.g., Roger Whitmore’s Auto. Servs., Inc. v. Lake City, 424 F.3d 659, 673 (7th 
Cir. 2005) (noting that the court has not hesitated to find that closed periods of several months 
to several years did not qualify as “substantial” enough to satisfy continuity). 
 222. See H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 242 (“Whether the predicates proved establish a threat of 
continued racketeering activity depends on the specific facts of each case.”).  
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length of time over which they were committed, the number of victims, the 
presence of separate schemes,223 and the distinct injuries involved.224   
To demonstrate open-ended continuity, a plaintiff must show that the 
predicate acts establish a threat of continued racketeering activity projecting 
into the future.225  Both the nature of the predicate acts and the nature of the 
alleged enterprise are relevant.  Where the enterprise primarily conducts a 
legitimate business, the plaintiff must show the predicate acts were the 
regular way the enterprise conducts its business or that the predicate acts, by 
their very nature, threaten continued criminal activity.226 
A plaintiff alleging a civil RICO violation against a medical ghostwriting 
first must identify a physician who engaged in at least two acts of fraudulent 
authorship within ten years.  Proving that the acts satisfy relatedness is 
relatively straightforward.  The relatedness factors of purpose, victims, and 
method involved, are similar in every act of fraudulent authorship.227  When 
a physician lends her name to an article, her purpose is to be published.  The 
victims are the medical journals and deceived readers.  And the method 
involved is a drafted manuscript presented to a physician for written 
approval.228  Multiple instances of fraudulent authorship, therefore, likely 
can be connected to one another. 
The continuity prong of the pattern requirement may be more difficult to 
establish.  Yet the factors that courts consider when determining closed-
ended continuity may be a viable method of establishing continuity for a 
 
 223. While the number of schemes may be a factor, the Supreme Court has explicitly 
rejected the rigid notion that a pattern is formed only when predicate acts are part of separate 
schemes. Id. at 236–37.  Instead, multiple predicate acts within a single scheme may constitute 
criminal activities that have long-term and widespread consequences. See id. 
 224. Park v. Jack’s Food Sys., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 914, 920 (D. Md. 1995) (noting that the 
Fourth Circuit has adopted a “case-by-case, fact specific approach” in determining whether 
the continuity requirement is met).  Other circuit courts look to similar factors in assessing 
whether the closed-ended concept of continuity has been satisfied. See, e.g., Columbia Nat. 
Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1110 (6th Cir. 1995) (noting that factors include the duration 
of the racketeering activity, the number of different schemes, the number of predicates, the 
types of injury, and the number of victims and perpetrators); Barticheck v. Fid. Union 
Bank/First Nat’l State, 832 F.2d 36, 38–39 (3d Cir. 1987) (applying factors including the 
number of unlawful acts, the length of time over which they were committed, the similarity of 
the acts, the number of victims and perpetrators, and the character of the unlawful activity); 
Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 975 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting that factors include 
the number and variety of predicate acts, the length of time over which they were committed, 
the number of victims, the presence of separate schemes, and the occurrence of distinct 
injuries); Gross v. Waywell, 628 F. Supp. 2d 475, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (applying factors such 
as the number and variety of predicate acts, the number of participants and victims and the 
presence of separate schemes). 
 225. See H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 241. 
 226. See, e.g., Cofacredit, S.A. v. Windsor Plumbing Supply Co., 187 F.3d 229, 243–44 
(2d Cir. 1999) (finding insufficient evidence to support a claim that mail and wire fraud were 
a regular means of doing business). 
 227. See supra note 215 and accompanying text. 
 228. Documents revealed in relation to Wyeth’s hormone replacement therapy show that 
“company executives came up with ideas for medical journal articles, titled them, drafted 
outlines, paid writers to draft the manuscripts, recruited academic authors and identified 
publications to run the articles—all without disclosing the companies’ roles to journal editors 
or readers.”  Wilson, supra note 93. 
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plaintiff.  Because of the importance of publication to physicians’ careers and 
the relationship between physicians and pharmaceutical companies,229 it is 
reasonable to assume that physicians agree to author numerous articles 
throughout their careers.  One doctor even reported that the request to author 
ghostwritten articles “happens all the time.”230  The authoring of numerous 
articles spanning over a physician’s career would constitute a large number 
of predicate acts lasting well beyond two years, favoring plaintiffs.  While 
there are similar injuries and a similar goal of obtaining publication, each act 
of authoring a ghostwritten article represents a distinct scheme.  Further, the 
vast number of victims—the duped medical journals and overpaying 
subscribers—may tip the scale toward finding that series of related predicates 
extended over a substantial period of time. 
Alternatively, the plaintiffs would need to show a threat of continuing 
criminal activity beyond the period during which the predicate acts were 
performed.  The strongest evidence of continued future activity would be an 
agreement between the authoring physician and pharmaceutical company 
showing an ongoing understanding that the physician’s name would be used 
to author future ghostwritten articles.  This does not necessarily have to be a 
formal contract but may be in the form of emails between a pharmaceutical 
company and a physician eliciting authorship for future publications.  Indeed, 
this would be an explicit threat that likely would satisfy the continuity prong 
necessary to establish a pattern of racketeering activity. 
c.  Enterprise 
The conduct prohibited in § 1962 is unlawful only if it occurs in connection 
with an “enterprise.”  RICO generally targets the bad actors who misuse a 
legitimate enterprise rather than the enterprise itself.  RICO defines enterprise 
as “any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, 
and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal 
entity.”231  Through its broad statutory language void of limiting or restrictive 
provisions, this definition recognizes both formal structures and groups of 
individuals as enterprises.232  However, this definition takes on a distinct 
meaning when referred to under § 1962(c).  Unlike the other types of conduct 
covered under civil RICO, a person under § 1962(c) is limited to someone 
who is employed by or associated with an enterprise.233  Because § 1962(c) 
is used to pursue individuals who use an organization and its resources to 
 
 229. A 2007 survey showed that 94 percent of physicians reported having a relationship 
with pharmaceutical companies. Eric G. Campbell et al., A National Survey of Physician-
Industry Relationships, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1742, 1743 (2007). 
 230. See Natasha Singer, Senator Moves to Block Medical Ghostwriting, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
18, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/19/health/research/19ethics.html?fta=y 
[https://perma.cc/H9HL-D9E6]. 
 231. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2012). 
 232. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) (“There is no restriction upon 
the associations embraced by the definition:  an enterprise includes any union or group of 
individuals associated in fact.”).  
 233. Any person may be charged with violations of § 1962(a), (b), or (d). See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1962(a)–(b), (d). 
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commit racketeering activity, courts have required that the defendant be 
separate and distinct from the enterprise where the alleged racketeering was 
conducted.234  Indeed, “enterprise” connotes the vehicle through which the 
pattern of racketeering activity is committed.235 
Many of the physicians solicited to author ghostwritten articles are 
affiliates of hospitals or, more commonly, academic institutions.236  The 
affiliation with a hospital or academic institution contributes to the 
physician’s prestige, which facilitates the solicitation to author an article in 
the first place.  These institutions therefore serve as the enterprise in which 
the pattern of racketeering activity occurs.  Therefore, physicians are 
“employed by or associated with” their respective institutions within the 
meaning of § 1962(c). 
III.  REVISING THE CURRENT 
MEDICAL PUBLICATION FRAMEWORK 
Given the challenges of bringing a successful civil RICO claim, revising 
the current medical publication framework offers a better means of 
addressing publication bias in medical research.  To combat such bias, this 
Part proposes greater enforcement of FDAAA disclosure requirements, as 
well as the implementation of a mandatory disclosure rule. 
A.  Challenges to Bringing a Civil RICO Claim 
While this Note proposes a viable cause of action under civil RICO against 
physicians who lent their names to ghostwritten articles, the claim 
nevertheless poses an uphill battle for plaintiffs.  Establishing a pattern of 
racketeering activity likely presents the greatest challenge to a successful 
claim.  Although there is speculation that many physicians engage in 
ghostwriting practices throughout their careers, generating proof of such 
engagement will be difficult.237 
A RICO claim against a physician necessarily rests on establishing, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that articles are ghostwritten.  These articles 
are not typically exposed until an investigation has been conducted through 
litigation.  Ideally, a civil RICO action would be brought against the involved 
physician alongside a larger action against the pharmaceutical company 
whose activities drew attention from regulators or the press.  Because of the 
vast amount of time involved in drug development, an investigation into a 
specific pharmaceutical company’s handling of a drug may reveal numerous 
articles from the same author spanning over many years.  Even so, such 
 
 234. Pierson, supra note 144, at 237; see, e.g., United States v. Goldin Indus., Inc., 219 
F.3d 1268, 1270 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting that, consistent with every other circuit that has 
addressed the question, the defendant in a § 1962(c) claim must be separate and distinct from 
the “enterprise” named therein). 
 235. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 259 (1994). 
 236. See Singer, supra note 230 (noting the growing body of evidence that suggests doctors 
at top medical schools have been attaching their names to scientific papers that were drafted 
by ghostwriters working for drug companies). 
 237. See supra text accompanying note 230. 
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litigation is uncommon.  A drug first must cause considerable harm to the 
public to initiate litigation. 
To make matters worse, even after ghostwriting is exposed, physicians 
who have served as authors often remain unnamed.  Thus, although many 
articles may be ghostwritten, the majority of these articles will go unnoticed, 
and the fraudulent authors will remain unknown.  Because civil RICO 
requires pattern of fraudulent activity, only repeat offenders—the physicians 
who regularly engage in ghostwriting practices—can be found liable.  This 
insulates a large number of physicians from civil RICO liability, even though 
their ghostwriting undoubtedly negatively affects public health. 
In addition to these substantive issues, litigation costs may dissuade 
plaintiffs from bringing civil RICO claims.  The potential of recovery, even 
if aggregated and trebled, may be nominal compared to the transaction costs 
inherent in such a claim.238   
There have also been many critiques of expanding civil RICO beyond its 
legislative intent.239  In fact, the Supreme Court expressed its concern that 
the statute was being used in ways that Congress may not have envisioned.240  
Holding physicians liable under civil RICO may therefore be met with harsh 
criticism because of reluctance to link physicians to a statute originally 
intended for criminals. 
In response to these criticisms, employing civil RICO to hold ghostwriting 
physicians liable is necessary to stop biased practices that harm public 
welfare.  Journal authorship requirements and academic bans on ghostwriting 
have not fully eradicated this harmful practice.  Thus, the deterrent effect that 
the threat of litigation carries becomes appealing when the health of the 
nation is at stake.  Holding physicians responsible for their contributions to 
ghostwriting will likely promote self-policing in the medical community.  
Physicians, who have taken an oath to do no harm, may be less likely to 
engage in a practice that is now a cognizable harm and may urge their fellow 
colleagues to do the same.  The threat of liability will shift the current culture 
of permissible dishonesty to a culture of transparency.  Even if problematic, 
this is a valuable and necessary threat.  Enforcement and revision of the 
current regulations governing medical publication, combined with the threat 
of civil RICO liability, stands the best chance at effectively stemming the 
continued practice of medical ghostwriting. 
 
 238. See, e.g., Xavier Bosch et al., Challenging Medical Ghostwriting in U.S. Courts, 
PLOS MED., Jan. 2012, at 1 (arguing that the costs of bringing a RICO claim would likely 
discourage law firms from prosecuting such cases because of “the novelty of the theories, and 
the nominal damages at issue”).  
 239. See generally Tricia Bozyk, Disgorging American Business:  An Examination of 
Overbroad Remedies in Civil RICO Cases, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 129 (2006) (arguing that the 
remedies available to the government and private plaintiffs bringing civil RICO claims should 
be limited); Eric Lloyd, Making Civil RICO “Suave”:  Congress Must Act to Ensure 
Consistent Judicial Interpretations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act, 47 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 123 (2007) (discussing the rise in civil RICO claims and federal 
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 240. See supra notes 139–42 and accompanying text.  
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B.  Enforcement of FDAAA Disclosure Requirements 
Enforcing compliance with the FDAAA requirements for clinical trial 
results is the first step in addressing issues of publication bias.241  While the 
effects of the most recent final rule are still unknown, the FDA must take 
more active measures in regulating the national registry.  Any study that is 
registered on the FDAAA website must also disclose the results, and the FDA 
must promptly notify noncompliant parties and enforce applicable 
penalties.242  Interestingly, the penalty for noncompliance was not increased 
in the final rule.243  While civil monetary penalties of up to $10,000 per day 
may cripple a study run by an independent researcher, studies funded by 
pharmaceutical companies will likely be unaffected by such a low penalty.  
A separate penalty should therefore be placed on studies funded by drug 
companies in an amount that will sufficiently deter the companies from 
noncompliance. 
However, the clinical trial results, even if disclosed, would do little to 
protect public health if prescribing physicians fail to see them.  To make the 
clinical trial results accessible to physicians, medical journals should provide 
a citation to the relevant results on the national registry within the drug’s 
publication.  The reading physician, at her own discretion, will then be 
prompted to review the full clinical trial results of the particular drug under 
consideration.  Physicians will, at the very least, be aware that the publication 
does not explain the full story and will tailor their practices accordingly. 
C.  Mandatory Disclosure of Authorship 
Ghostwriting involves fraudulent authorship, but the pharmaceutical 
industry’s practice of hiring external companies to draft manuscripts for 
publication is not, in itself, fraudulent.  In fact, it is a necessary industry 
practice.  Because of the volume of results generated in the development of 
a new drug, pharmaceutical companies and investigators are unable to draft 
all the literature associated with the results on their own.244  Professional 
communication agencies therefore play an important role in the effective and 
ethical promotion of a product.245  The needs of the pharmaceutical industry 
must be taken into consideration when deciding how to resolve this public 
health issue. 
1.  Mandatory Disclosure Rule 
Rather than restricting pharmaceutical companies from outsourcing 
manuscripts for publication or requiring that the researchers involved in the 
original clinical trials draft the manuscripts, the less burdensome solution lies 
 
 241. See supra notes 49–64 and accompanying text. 
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in disclosure.  Indeed, ghostwriting only becomes ghostwriting, and 
consequentially fraudulent, when there is a lack of authorship disclosure.  To 
avoid issues of fraud, the FDA should institute rulemaking to enforce 
mandatory disclosure of authorship.  Authors should be required to disclose 
the role they played in drafting the manuscript, and any author, whether 
pharmaceutical company, medical communication agency, or physician, 
should be acknowledged in the final publication.  While the private ordering 
by the ICMJE in recommending such disclosure provides certain 
protection,246 public ordering in the form of a rule promulgated by the FDA 
would create a uniform standard for all medical journals.  A lack of 
authorship disclosure would signal to physicians serving as authors and 
editors of medical journals that an FDA violation likely occurred.  All parties 
would then have the opportunity to ensure that compliance is met.  A rule 
promulgated by the FDA would also announce to the medical community 
that ghostwriting is not a mere moral failing but rather a legal violation 
deserving of regulatory action. 
Such regulation aimed at reducing biased prescribing practices is not 
novel.  Along with the enactment of the FDAAA, the FDA has imposed 
advertising limitations on pharmaceutical companies.247  Additionally, in 
response to the growing concern that gifts from pharmaceutical companies to 
physicians distort judgment in prescribing practices, several state legislatures 
have imposed limitations on gift giving.248  These limitations are justified 
because gifts have been shown to entice health professionals into 
relationships that subtly call for reciprocity, thereby influencing prescribing 
behaviors.249  Similarly, the chance to author a prominent publication without 
having to satisfy authorship criteria should be examined because it can be 
seen as a gift from a drug company.  Scrutiny here is justified because a 
publication supporting the use of a particular drug authored by a prominent 
physician entices other physicians to prescribe the drug.  The ethical concern 
in both situations is the same—distortion of physicians’ judgment in 
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prescribing medicine.  A similar solution should therefore be imposed in the 
form of mandatory disclosure. 
2.  Constitutional Concern 
One constitutional concern regarding mandatory disclosure is whether it 
impedes on the exercise of free speech.  In 1976, the Supreme Court 
determined that the First Amendment protects commercial speech.250  Since 
then, the FDA has had to confront the free speech rights of its regulated 
entities.  The extent of these rights, however, depends on whether the speech 
is commercial or noncommercial, as the government enjoys much more 
freedom to regulate the former.251  This disparity arises from the different 
tests courts apply.  For laws targeting commercial speech, courts apply 
intermediate scrutiny, whereas laws targeting noncommercial speech receive 
more stringent scrutiny.252  Intermediate scrutiny allows courts to ask 
whether the content of commercial speech is false or misleading, opening the 
door for content-based objections generally forbidden in noncommercial 
contexts.253 
The prevailing test to determine whether speech is commercial or not asks 
(1) whether the speech is an advertisement, (2) whether it refers to a specific 
product, and (3) whether the speaker has an economic motive.254  While 
seemingly straightforward, this test becomes complicated in the context of 
scientific speech, where companies make scientific claims about the health 
and safety of their products.  Courts have traditionally noted that scientific 
articles, published for educational purposes, are a protected form of 
noncommercial speech.255  Thus, the publication of an article addressing 
scientific findings in a peer-reviewed journal generally does not constitute 
commercial speech. 
But at what point is protected scientific inquiry transformed into 
commercial speech subject to stricter scrutiny?  Courts have often found that 
a scientific article becomes commercial speech when, for example, it contains 
favorably false information about a product and is written by the company 
that manufactures the product.256  Courts have adopted a skeptical view 
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towards FDA-regulated bodies, heeding Justice William Brennan’s warning 
that “those who seek to convey commercial messages will engage in the most 
imaginative of exercises to place themselves within the safe haven of 
noncommercial speech, while at the same time conveying their commercial 
message.”257  Professor Nathan Cortez found that out of twenty-four cases 
where FDA-regulated entities claimed First Amendment protection, courts 
categorized the speech as commercial in all but two.258 
Pharmaceutical companies clearly engage in practices of publication bias 
and increasingly use medical journals as a platform for marketing and selling 
their products.259  The prevalence of publication bias demands that articles 
published in medical journals be treated as commercial speech subject to 
regulation by the FDA.260 
While the government may protect consumers from false or misleading 
information,261 it generally may not prohibit truthful and nondeceptive 
claims in pursuit of other valuable ends.262  If the FDA goes beyond guarding 
against the dissemination of false or misleading information and seeks to 
promote broader public health goals, the agency will likely violate the First 
Amendment.  Therefore, the question this Note seeks to answer is whether 
requiring mandatory disclosure of authorship protects consumers from false 
or misleading information. 
The answer to this question is yes.  Requiring authors of ghostwritten 
publications to disclose their level of involvement protects journals and their 
subscribers from the false or misleading information conveyed through the 
false warranty of authorship.  Claiming authorship of an article that the 
physician had no involvement in writing is neither a truthful nor a 
nondeceptive claim.  Without disclosing the author’s level of involvement, 
the reader is led to believe that the physician named as the author is 
responsible for the information conveyed.  This, of course, would be false.  
Therefore, the FDA has the constitutional authority to promulgate a 
mandatory disclosure rule in an effort to protect the readers from false or 
misleading information. 
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While mandating disclosure of authorship is not a panacea for all 
misleading articles, disclosure of ghostwriting will signal to readers that an 
article must be read with caution.  There is the hope that, if legitimate authors 
are held accountable for the content of a publication, all parties involved will 
ensure that articles convey the most accurate representation of the results on 
which they are based. 
CONCLUSION 
Medical journals contribute significantly to public health by disseminating 
medical information to physicians, thereby influencing prescribing practices.  
Yet, through selective publishing and medical ghostwriting, the information 
guiding treatment decisions has become polluted and distorted, negatively 
affecting patient care.  Through the selective publication of clinical trial 
results that show positive findings in support of a particular drug, prescribing 
physicians are blind to the true effects of the medications they prescribe.  
Worse yet, prescribing physicians can be unaware of the true author of a 
publication, giving undue credence to an article based on the prestige of an 
author recruited by a pharmaceutical company to serve as nothing more than 
a mere signature. 
While the medical community and regulators have made efforts to reduce 
publication bias in medical research, this Note advocates a novel approach 
by imposing civil RICO on physicians involved in medical ghostwriting.  
Although Congress enacted RICO in response to the destruction caused by 
organized crime’s infiltration of legitimate businesses, the statute’s broad and 
liberal construction has facilitated its use to areas beyond traditional 
organized crime, including its use in claims against the pharmaceutical 
industry. 
By applying the elements under § 1962(c), this Note concludes that using 
civil RICO against physicians involved in ghostwriting is a viable.  However, 
because the pattern requirement under § 1962(c) will render a civil RICO 
claim challenging, this Note also proposes alternative approaches to 
addressing publication bias.  By enforcing FDAAA compliance and imposing 
a mandatory disclosure rule for authorship, prescribing physicians will have 
access to all clinical trial results and will be made aware of potential bias in 
the medical publications that guide their practices.  The culture of 
transparency that is created through the threat of litigation and regulatory 
reform will ultimately lead to more informed, and consequently superior, 
patient care, positively affecting public health. 
 
